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Abstract
We show that the distribution of plant size within narrowly dened industries is aected by the
variation in the stock of civic capital that occurs at the provincial level. Data on plant size come
from the 2001 Italian Census of Manufacturing and Services. Civic capital turns out to have a positive
eect on both the average and the standard deviation of the plant size distribution. This eect is
stronger in labor-intensive industries. The potential endogeneity of current civic capital is addressed
by instrumenting it with historical variables. Our interpretation for these results is that civic capital
is associated with reduced opportunistic behavior, which improves intra-rm cooperation and hampers
the incidence of principal-agent problems, thus allowing plants to operate on a larger scale.
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1 Introduction
What determines the size distribution of economic organizations in dierent industries? Oligopoly theory
stresses the role of market size: in large markets, competitive pressures are intense and reduce the mark-
up of rms. In order to recover the xed costs of production, each rm has to operate on a larger scale,
which increases average size. Similarly, models of monopolistic competition with heterogeneous rms such
as Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) predict that market size increases both average size and the standard devi-
ation of size. Empirical evidence has conrmed these theoretical predictions. Employing data on 13 retail
industries in the US, Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) show that market size has a magnifying eect on
average establishment size. Moreover, they nd that the dispersion in plant size is positively related to the
size of the local market in some retail industries, but not in all of them. Similarly, Syverson (2004) shows
that, for the concrete industry in the US, market size increases plant size.
In this paper, we empirically identify another fundamental determinant of the size distribution of estab-
lishments: the stock of local civic capital.1 Employing Italian 2001 Census data, we show that civic capital
allows economic organizations to operate on a larger scale, leading to higher average plant size. Moreover,
our results document an increase in the dispersion of establishment size. We motivate these ndings by an
important property of civic capital in that it serves as a check against opportunistic behavior and hence
increases the likelihood of cooperative outcomes in collective endeavors. Therefore, civic capital plays a
crucial role in intra-rm relationships, where a smooth ow of information is required for decision making,
where CEOs have to eciently coordinate a wide variety of tasks, where decisions have to be communicated
in a transparent way, and diverging individual interests need to be bridged for the sake of the rm as a whole.
In short, the internal eciency of organizations depends crucially on the extent to which individuals coop-
erate. In principle, there exist several mechanisms which sustain cooperation, such as relational contracts,
external enforcement, or kinship bonds. However, interactions within rms often take place in contexts
where (i) external enforcement is hampered by unobservability of actions or problems of performance mea-
surement, (ii) interactions are not repeated frequently, and (iii) agents are not related to their partner by
personal bonds. In those situations cooperation among individuals hinges crucially on civic capital and its
associated high level of trust. In addition, the importance of civic capital in sustaining cooperation depends
on the size of the organization in that the scope for opportunistic defection increases with the number of
workers. Standard models of moral hazard predict that the probability of shirking increases with team size
(Holmstrom, 1982), as each member gets a lower share of output. Moreover, relational contracting is less
feasible because interactions between any two members of an organization become less frequent.
Our choice of focusing on Italian data bears several important advantages. First, the variation in the
endowment of civic capital across Italy has received ample interest in social sciences (Baneld, 1958; Putnam,
1993; Guiso et al., 2004, 2008a). This allows us to circumvent the contentious measurement issue, as we can
fall back on a range of well-established proxies which are available at a geographically disaggregated level.
Specically, we build on Guiso et al. (2004) and measure civic capital by the number of blood donations
and electoral turnout in referenda.2 The extent to which individuals engage in volunteering in non-prot
1Although conceptually closely related, we avoid using the loaded term of social capital. See section 2 for a denition of
civic capital and its relationship with trust.
2Other studies which use these measures include Buonanno et al. (2009), and de Blasio and Nuzzo (2010).
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organizations completes the set of measures. Second, working on Italy allows us to use data from the
8th Census on Industry and Services (2001) which provides detailed information on the 4.4 millions plants
operating in Italy. Hence, our analysis does not suer from sample selection issues, provided that we
are working with the universe of Italian establishments. Third, by focusing on one country, other factors
typically aecting plant size like government subsidies, employment regulation or tax regimes are held
constant.
In order to claim a causal impact of civic capital on economic outcomes, it is crucial to overcome several
potential sources of endogeneity. The rst problem concerns measurement error. None of our three proxies
accurately reects the true stock of civic capital. In order to minimize measurement error and the resulting
attenuation bias, we extract the rst principle component of the three variables of civic capital.
The second problem is the issue of reversed causality. According to the modernization theory, economic
development has a direct impact on the formation of cultural and social values, thereby determining the level
of civic capital (Inglehart and Baker, 2000). Similarly, trust in others is likely to be triggered by trust in
political and legal institutions (Rothstein, 2000). Accordingly, ecient law enforcement both produces high
levels of civic capital and favors economic activity, resulting in large plants. Similarly to Buonanno et al.
(2009) and de Blasio and Nuzzo (2010), we use historical data to overcome the problem of reversed causality
and omitted variables. In particular, we use information on civic capital at the middle of the 19th and
beginning of the 20th century. Moreover, relying on Putnam (1993) and Guiso et al. (2008a), a second set
of instruments is based on the number of free-city states in the territory of a province during the Middle
Age.
Several controls ensure that our results are not driven by confounding factors. To separate civic capital
from confounding unobservables related to socio-economic development, we exploit only its variation at
the provincial level within the 20 Italian regions, by including a dummy for each region. In addition, we
interpret our data set as a panel, where observations pertaining to a given industry are collected repeatedly
over dierent provinces. Industry-specic heterogeneity is accordingly removed by four-digit Nace industry
xed eects. Moreover, based on Input-Output Use tables, we construct a proxy for local nal demand.
The quality of contract enforcement, human capital, nancial development, urbanization rates in 1861, and
GDP, all dened at the province level, complete the set of controls.
Results reveal that the variation of civic capital has a magnifying impact on both the mean and the
dispersion of the plant size distribution. Consistently with this, we nd that the number of large plants is
higher in high-civic capital areas. We attribute this increase to the fact that civic capital is associated with
a reduction in opportunistic behavior of agents in the local area, which in turn leads to more cooperation in
intra-rm relationships, and hampers the incidence of principal-agent problems. We discuss at length these
mechanisms below. Empirically, the eect of civic capital is heterogeneous across dierent industries: we
nd that the impact is stronger in industries where the capital-labor ratio is low. Concerning the economic
magnitude of our results, the model predicts that the dierence in the endowment of civic capital between
the provinces of Naples (low civic capital) and Milan (high civic capital) is associated with a dierence in
the average size of plants of 25%.
The positive relationship between civic capital and the size of organizations is a priori not straightforward,
though. In principle, there are at least two mechanisms why civic capital could actually be associated with
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a decrease in average plant size. On the one hand, the inuential transaction costs literature (Williamson,
1979, 1985) stresses that, when faced with the make-or-buy decision, rms choose the form of exchange
that minimizes transaction costs. If civic capital decreases opportunistic behavior, contract incompleteness
should decrease as well. Consequently, market transactions become more attractive relative to in-house
production, and so some activities are outsourced to external suppliers and the average size of plants could
decrease.3 On the other hand, civic capital is positively related to entrepreneurship. Tabellini (2010) shows
that the prevailing cultural traits in Southern Italy are such that they discourage individual initiative and
eort, which is supposed to hinder the foundation of new rms.4 Accordingly, de Blasio and Nuzzo (2010)
and Percoco (2011) show that in the Italian context civic capital increases entrepreneurship, which could
then decrease the average size of plants, provided that newly established rms are smaller.
All in all, the Census data we employ unambiguously reveal that the overall eect of civic capital on
the average size of organizations is positive, despite the fact that the mechanisms just mentioned point to
a possibile negative eect. This is one contribution of our paper.
Another contribution is that we identify a novel determinant that aects the size distribution of plants,
beside local market size. Moreover, while papers like Syverson (2004) and Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005)
limit their analysis to a narrow set of industries, our study establishes a regularity which holds for the whole
spectrum of economic activity.
Next, whereas the literature on the determinants of rm size has stressed the role of formal institu-
tions such as the quality of contract enforcement or the protection of property rights (Kumar et al., 1999;
Laeven and Woodru, 2007; Lu and Tao, 2009), our analysis implies that informal institutions matter di-
rectly in this respect.
Finally, the idea that informal institutions such as trust are important for the functioning of large
organizations has been formulated by Fukuyama (1995). However, he does not corroborate his claim with
some strong empirical evidence. La Porta et al. (1997) provide a cross-country analysis of the relative
importance of large organizations and the level of trust. They analyze the sales of the top twenty largest
rms relative to national GDP. Dierently from them, our analysis focuses on the absolute size of the
universe of plants in Italy. Bloom et al. (2009) are closer to our approach, since they show, in a cross-
country analysis, that the average of rm size for manufacturing as a whole, measured at the regional level
in terms of NUTS 2 spatial units, is larger in regions where trust is higher. Our paper substantially improves
their analysis in terms of precision in at least two ways. First, we are able to assess how the size distribution
within each single 4-digit Nace industry in the Italian Census changes according to the variation in the level
of trust. Second, we do it at a very detailed spatial scale (provinces, which correspond to NUTS 3 spatial
units).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide a denition of civic capital and
outline how it relates to opportunistic behavior and trust. In section 3, we present the data and describe
the construction of the variables. Section 4 presents the baseline OLS analysis. Sections 5 and 6 provide
3In a related study (Burker and Minerva, 2010) we show that civic capital favors outsourcing of business services. Speci-
cally, relative to overall sales, rms acquire more services on the market in areas where civic capital is high.
4Similarly, in his illustrative study on social and economic life in a small village in Southern Italy, Baneld (1958) has
observed a mentality of the local population characterized by resignation and helplessness.
4
robustness analysis and two-stages least square results, respectively. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Conceptual framework
2.1 The concept of civic capital
Guiso et al. (2010) dene civic capital as \those persistent and shared beliefs and values that help a group
overcome the free rider problem in the pursuit of socially valuable activities".5 Two immediate and in-
terrelated predictions of civic capital can be derived from this denition. First, civic capital is associated
with a reduction in opportunism. This is an immediate implication from the denition, as free-riding in
collective endeavors is a genuine form of opportunistic behavior. Second, areas with more civic capital
are expected to have higher levels of trust. The literature has stressed that the decision to trust another
group or person depends on both the belief in the trustworthiness of others and on individual preferences
(Fehr, 2009; Sapienza et al., 2007). Opportunistic behavior, dened as \self-interest seeking which guile"
includes \calculated eorts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse" (Williamson, 1985,
p. 47). It is therefore reasonable to assume that in an area in which opportunistic behavior is widespread,
individuals form adverse beliefs about the trustworthiness of others, resulting in a distrusting environment.
Similarly, to the extent that civic capital is associated with widespread pro-social preferences, this should
also lead to high trust (Fehr, 2009). Given the interrelatedness between civic capital and trust, in what
follows we will use the two terms interchangeably.6
2.2 Civic capital, trust and the size of organizations
The reasoning above suggests that civic capital improves overall organizational eciency of rms by facil-
itating cooperation and reducing the scope of agency problems and dilemmas of collective actions, which
are centered around opportunism. Arrow (1968) has made this point plainly clear by stating that \one
of the characteristics of a successful economic system is that the relations of trust and condence between
principal and agent are suciently strong so that the agent will not cheat even though it may be `rational
economic behavior' to do so".7
In this section we outline three specic mechanisms of how civic capital improves cooperation in intra-
rm relationships such that it increases establishment size. However, our analysis does not allow to make a
5This deviation from strict self-interest can be explained by pro-social attitudes such as altruism (Andreoni and Miller,
2002), inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), preferences for reciprocal fairness (Falk and Fischbacher, 2006) or more
generally by strongly internalized values which constitute a moral obligation not to defect (Portes, 1998). An alternative
mechanism stresses the social component of civic capital. Specically, individuals cooperate in order not to be socially ostracized
by their fellows (Portes, 1998).
6It is important to stress that in the agency literature trust is usually modelled as an endogenous outcome of rm strategies.
The enhancement of trust can be obtained through motivational schemes (Casadesus-Masanell, 2004) or by facilitating social
interactions outside the workplace during sport activities, holidays, etc. (Spagnolo, 1999). We abstain from all these aspects
and consider trust as exogenously determined by civic capital. Empirical evidence corroborates the validity of this assumption.
Employing data on a large Italian bank, Ichino and Maggi (2000) demonstrate that individual background is a chief determinant
of cooperative behavior at the workplace. Along these lines, we assume that intra-plant cooperation is exclusively determined
by the stock of civic capital in the province where the plant is located, as embodied by the workers.
7See p. 538.
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qualitative assessment of their relative importance. Rather, the aim is to show that our empirical ndings are
well-grounded in the predictions of some theoretical models. First, we look at the decision of the principal
to delegate decision rights to the agent. Next, we consider team production, while the third mechanism by
which civic capital impacts on plant size relies on the fact that, as organizations get larger, cooperation in
one-shot transactions becomes increasingly more important.
2.2.1 Trust and the delegation of authority
The rst mechanism of how civic capital translates into larger establishment size works through the delega-
tion of decision authority by CEOs to subordinate managers. In theoretical models of allocation of decision
rights, trust makes the objective functions of the principal and the agent more similar. The rationale behind
is that a reduction in opportunistic behavior implies that the agent is less likely to take actions which merely
serve his private goals rather than the benet of the organization as a whole. In Aghion and Tirole (1997)
these congruence eects increase the agent's willingness to pay for authority relative to the principal which
leads to more delegation. Alternatively, in Dessein (2002), higher similarity in objective functions reduces
the incurred loss of control by the principal and improves communication. Under standard assumptions on
the uncertainty of the environment, the decrease in the loss of control outweighs the communication eect
which leads to more delegation. Delegation of tasks and decision rights, in turn, is crucial for the growth of
the size of plants. Penrose (1959) stressed that CEOs face resource constraints in terms of time and cognitive
abilities if they have a wide span of control. This acts as a stumbling block on establishment growth, as the
CEO has to invest costly resources such as time and eort to manage and decide upon complex business
operations. Delegation then reduces the overload of CEOs and frees resources necessary for expansion.8
2.2.2 Trust and shirking in team work
When individual contributions in team production are unobservable and the team members' remuneration is
linked to overall team output, individuals have an incentive to free-ride on their colleagues (Alchian and Demsetz,
1972; Holmstrom, 1982). As suggested by its denition, civic capital plays an important role in reducing in-
dividual shirking in collective endeavors. Ichino and Maggi (2000) show in the Italian context that shirking,
dened as absenteeism and misconduct, is higher in the low civic capital regions in the South.
Becker and Murphy (1992) illustrate how uncooperative behavior in team work reduces the size of plants.
In their model rm output is the cooperative outcome of a team of workers. In order to produce a unit
of nal output, a given number of complementary tasks has to be performed. As both workers and tasks
are assumed to be identical, each worker performs an equally large set of tasks. The working time of
each member consists in acquiring task-specic skills and then performing the production tasks. As the
size of the team increases, each worker performs a smaller set of tasks which increases its prociency in
production (for example, due to learning by doing). On the other hand, as specialization increases, so
does the probability that the production chain collapses as the demand for coordination increases in the
number of workers. Optimal team size is then given by the trade-o between gains from specialization and
8Chandler (1962) provides historical evidence that the growth of several North-American corporations was spurred by the
creation of separated divisions within rms and the corresponding delegation of decision authority to subordinates.
6
coordination costs. In a framework like Becker and Murphy (1992), civic capital can be thought to reduce
shirking and coordination costs, and to allow for larger teams.
2.2.3 Trust and cooperation in one-shot transactions
Relational contracts play an important role in governing intra-rm relationships (Baker et al., 2002). If
employees interact frequently, the threat to terminate the relationship in the case of defection acts as an
eective enforcement device. In particular, as long as the discounted gains from future trade outweigh short-
run benets from defection, agents have an incentive to stick to informal agreements. However, the frequency
of interactions between two given employees depends on the size of the plant. In large establishments in which
production is fragmented into numerous divisions, the probability that agents interfere with \strangers" is
much larger than in smaller ones. Hence, the role of reputation and implicit contracts decreases because
interactions are less likely to be repeated. Again, if transactions take place in trusting environments,
cooperative outcomes can be sustained even if the game is not repeated (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002).9
2.2.4 Testable implications
These considerations allow us to derive our main working hypotheses. First of all, the discussion above
makes clear why we expect that, in areas where the stock of civic capital is high, plants should be larger. As
to the standard deviation of average size, the way it may react to civic capital is very much in line with the
way market size increases the standard deviation in the theoretical model of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
If in areas where civic capital is high we have a larger average size of plants, this may also bring an increase
in the standard deviation due to the direct magnifying eect on the size distribution. We will describe more
concretely this issue in the discussion of the empirical results.
The second implication of our framework is that we expect some heterogeneity in the impact of civic
capital on the plant size distribution across dierent industries. Specically, we expect industries where
there is an intense interaction among workers to be more reactive to the stock of local civic capital. The
reason simply lies on the fact that the mechanisms of how civic capital aects relationships at the level of
plants are rmly grounded in interpersonal contacts. Conversely, we expect plants where the production
process is based on standardized routines and automation to be less sensitive to civic capital.10
3 Data and variables
In this section, we describe the dierent data sources used. We then discuss in detail the procedure that we
follow to build the variables. First of all, let us describe the industrial and geographic scales we work with.
Industries are classied according to the Statistical Classication of Economic Activities in the European
Community (NACE), rev. 1. We work with a disaggregation at the 4-digit level, which classies the entire
spectrum of economic activity into 503 dierent industries. We keep in the sample only establishments
9When explaining dierences in the size of rms across countries, Fukuyama (1995) stresses this important property of
trust.
10Automation is the use of control systems and information technologies to reduce the need for the intervention of human
work in the production of goods and services.
7
which are owned by private entities, and we exclude establishments owned by non-prot organizations and
public institutions.11
Concerning the geographic disaggregation, we work with the 103 Italian provinces existing in 2001.12
We work with provinces, and not with smaller spatial units, because data on civic capital are not available
at a smaller level of geography. However, working with provinces is particularly convenient provided that
it allows us to have a suciently large number of observations for each 4-digit industry.13
3.1 Plant size distribution
The data on plant size come from the 8th Census of Industry and Services carried out by the Italian national
statistic authority (Istat) in 2001, covering the universe of Italian establishments. In the Census, plants
are classied into 12 dierent size bins, according to the size of the plant in terms of workers.14 For each
province and each industry, the data set then provides information on the total number of plants and the
total number of workers in a given size bin.15
Let us now turn to the description of the dependent variables that we employ in the analysis. Following
Kumar et al. (1999) and Laeven and Woodru (2007), the rst dependent variable that we dene is the
weighted average of plant size in 4-digit industry i and province j. In formal terms we compute average
plant size (APS) as:
APSi;j =
nX
b=1
 
Nempb;i;j
Nestabb;i;j
!

 
Nempb;i;j
Nempi;j
!
; (1)
where Nempb;i;j is the total number of workers in bin b, industry i, and province j, N
estab
b;i;j is the total number
of plants in a given bin-province-industry, while Nempi;j is the total number of workers in industry i and
province j for all size bins. Hence, in this formula we weight the average size per bin, as given by the rst
fraction in equation (1), by the share of workers working in that bin over the total number of workers in
the province-industry. The literature has emphasized that the rationale for this weighting scheme is to put
more weight on those plants which carry out the bulk of economic activity in a given province-industry, and
to weaken the impact on average plant size of a large number of small plants.
In the robustness checks, we also consider a simplied version of (1), in which each size bin is weighted
by the share of rms in that bin:
APSi;j =
nX
b=1
 
Nempb;i;j
Nestabb;i;j
!

 
Nestabb;i;j
Nestabi;j
!
=
Nempi;j
Nestabi;j
: (2)
This amounts to a simple division of the total number of workers by the total number of plants for each
province-industry combination. We refer to APSi;j as the simple average plant size. Moreover, we will
also look at the eect of civic capital on total employment in the province-industry, Nempi;j , on the total
11This choice implies that are excluded from the analysis industries where plants are exclusively managed by non-prot or
government institutions, like health, social services and public administration.
12Italian provinces correspond to the NUTS 3 partitioning.
13The average number of observations for each industry is 70, which amounts to say that, on average, a 4-digit industry can
be found in 70 provinces out of a total of 103.
14The bin categories are the following: bin number 1 (0 workers), 2 (1 worker), 3 (2 workers), 4 (3-5 workers), 5 (6-9), 6
(10-19), 7 (20-49 workers), 8 (50-99), 9 (100-199), 10 (200-499), 11 (500-999), 12 (1000 and more).
15The information about plant size in the Istat Census is similar to the one provided in the County Business Patterns for
the U.S. County Business Patterns data are used, for example, in Holmes and Stevens (2002).
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number of establishments, Nestabi;j , and on the number of establishments above or below the 20 employees
size threshold.
The other feature of the size distribution of plants in a given province-industry that we want to charac-
terize is the degree of dispersion around the mean. For this reason, we consider a set of regressions where
the dependent variable is the standard deviation of weighted plant size in industry i and province j. It is
dened as:
SDPSi;j =
vuut nX
b=1
" 
Nempb;i;j
Nestabb;i;j
!
 APSi;j
#2

 
Nempb;i;j
Nempi;j
!
: (3)
This variable puts more weight in the computation of dispersion on the size bins that carry out the bulk
of economic activity in a given province-industry. The counterpart of (2) which will be employed in the
robustness section is:
SDPSi;j =
vuut nX
b=1
" 
Nempb;i;j
Nestabb;i;j
!
 APSi;j
#2

 
Nestabb;i;j
Nestabi;j
!
: (4)
Finally, notice that in the baseline analysis a given industry in a given province is included in the nal
sample only if at least three plants are located there.16
In order to highlight the dierence between the weighting schemes employed, Figure 1 provides a graph-
ical representation of the empirical size distribution of plants. The two graphs show the size distribution
for the Manufacture of Tools (Nace rev. 1 code 2862) in two provinces of Tuscany, Siena and Pistoia.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Size bins are plotted on the horizontal axis, with the value on top of the bars indicating average plant
size in that bin; that is, Nempb;i;j =N
estab
b;i;j . On the vertical axis we measure the value of the weight given to
the bins. For each bin, the two bars correspond to the two dierent weights. The dark gray bars provide
the weights based on employees, as in equations (1) and (3). The light gray bars provide the weights based
on the number of establishments, as in equations (2) and (4). By putting more weight on large plants,
the employee-based weighting scheme increases both the average and standard deviation of plant size. For
example, in Siena APS is 18.04, while APS is halved in magnitude, taking the value of 9.3. As for the
standard deviation, SDPS is 10.42, and SDPS is 9.02. The idea behind our paper is to assess whether,
for provinces belonging to the same region (say, Tuscany) and the same 4-digit industry (say, Manufacture
of Tools) we can establish if part of the change in the plant size distributions like those of Figure 1 can be
attributed to the variation in the stock of civic capital at the provincial level.
The maps displayed in Figure 2 and 3 show the geographic variation of APS and SDPS across Italian
provinces.
[Insert Figures 2, 3 about here]
Not surprisingly, APS is the highest in the metropolitan areas of Milan, Rome and Turin. Moreover,
the map reveals that average plant size is generally larger in the Northern part of the country. This
pattern is even more evident in the case of the dispersion in plant size, as shown in Figure 3. The three
16The rationale for this choice is to exclude observations where the dependent variable is computed from very few plants. In
the robustness and sensitivity analysis we also include observations based on one or two plants only.
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metropolitan areas just mentioned stand out, and the higher frequency of light-gray-colored provinces in
the North reveals a substantial North-South dierence in the dispersion of plant size. The only three
light-gray-colored provinces in the South pertain to the metropolitan areas of Naples, Bari and Palermo.
3.2 Measurement of civic capital
We employ several proxies to measure the stock of civic capital in a given province. These are blood
donations and the number of volunteers in non-prot organizations, both standardized by population, and
electoral participation in referenda over the period between 1946 and 1987.17 Although quite dierent, all
three activities share common properties which make them suitable proxies for the stock of civic capital in
a province. First, individuals who donate blood, participate in volunteering or vote incur a non-negligible
cost. These costs often exceed the mere opportunity cost of time devoted to each of these activities.18
Second, and most important, none of these activities provide nancial or legal incentives, so individuals do
not obtain any economic pay-o. Rather, individuals who donate blood, engage in volunteering, or vote
in referenda express a concern for some common good, triggered either by social preferences or by social
pressure.19 As outlined in section 2, the diusion of these traits among the local population accounts for
the stock of civic capital in a province.
Figures 4, 5, 6 show the geographic distribution of blood donation, volunteering and electoral turnout,
respectively. All three maps reveal that civic capital is higher in the Central and Northern part of the
country.
[Insert Figures 4, 5, 6 about here]
Table 1 provides evidence that there exists a pronounced positive correlation between each of the three
proxies. The relationships are roughly equally strong in magnitude but nevertheless far from being perfect.
Despite broad common patterns, the maps reveal some dierences. This indicates that none of the three
proxies can be taken as a precise measure of the stock of local civic capital. Rather, each variable is
blurred by idiosyncratic factors which induce a certain geographic participation pattern, although they are
orthogonal to the prevalence of civic capital.20
[Insert Table 1 about here]
In order to remove the noise, we look at the common component of the three proxies. The last row in
Table 1 shows the correlation of the three proxies with their rst principal component.21 The fact that the
17In Appendix 8.1 we provide a detailed description of the variables and their sources.
18For example, donating blood imposes a substantial physical limitation in the short-run, voting requires information gath-
ering and personal evaluation of alternatives.
19See Putnam (1993) p. 93 for reasons why turnout referenda is more suitable than participation in \normal" political
elections. For a general motivation of the choice of electoral turnout to proxy civic capital see again Putnam (1993).
20For example, let us think to the 1987 referenda, dealing with some laws regulating the installation of nuclear plants in
Italy, which assumed in the political debate the status of a vote against the use of nuclear energy. It is well known that the
local population is strongly against the presence of nuclear plants in his own territory (this is sometimes referred to as the
`nimby' syndrome). Then, participation rates in 1987 referenda across Italian provinces could be driven by the presence of
nuclear plants in the territory, in addition to the stock of civic capital.
21In Appendix 8.2 we briey review how to derive the rst principal component.
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correlation with each of the individual trust variables is strong, with only slight dierences in magnitude,
suggests that all three proxies have a pronounced common dimension. Put dierently, the rst principal
component identies the behavioral attitude of the local population that simultaneously underlies the choice
of whether to donate blood, participate on a voluntary basis in non-prot organizations, or vote in referenda;
that is, it identies the values and beliefs that account for the stock of civic capital.22
Figure 7 shows the geographic distribution across Italian provinces of the measure of civic capital based
on the rst principal component. As before, we nd that civic capital is the highest in regions in the Center-
North, like Emilia-Romagna, and the lowest in the Southern mainland and Sicily. However, it is important
to stress that our identication strategy relies on the variation of civic capital at the provincial level within
Italian regions, because we will introduce in the empirical analysis dummy variables at the regional level.
Figure 8 illustrates this variation within regions. Specically, the map shows the residuals from a regression
of the principal component of civic capital on a set of regional dummies. The fact that provinces with
very high and very low residuals, as evidenced by white and black-colored areas, are dispersed all over the
country indicates that the variation of civic capital that we exploit is equally pronounced in all parts of
Italy.
[Insert Figures 7, 8 about here]
In the analysis we also use historical variables of civic capital as instruments. The rst historical measure
is the number of mutual aid societies in 1873, standardized by population. These predominantly urban
associations served craftsmen and artisans as a form of insurance against economic and social calamities.
The second measure is average electoral turnout in elections during the period 1919-1921. Both variables
are available at the regional level.23 The last historical instrument is related to the type of early political
institutions that were prevalent in the territory of a given province in 1300. More specically, we employ
the number of cities in each province that were free city-states in the year 1300. This variable is based on
data from Guiso et al. (2008a).24 In section 6 we justify the choice of these variables as instruments for
current civic capital.
3.3 Other explanatory variables
The size distribution of establishments may be aected by a wide range of factors. For this reason, we control
for as many determinants as possible.25 The rst control variable that we consider is the size of the local
market. Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) show in a monopolistically competitive model with rm heterogeneity
that average rm size (both in terms of output and sales) is larger in bigger markets. This theoretical result
is in accordance with the empirical ndings for the U.S. (Syverson, 2004; Campbell and Hopenhayn, 2005).
22Another example where the rst principal component is used to summarize common cultural traits at the regional level is
Tabellini (2010).
23For a detailed description consult the Appendix 8.1 and Putnam (1993).
24The authors, in order to reduce the cost of collecting historical data at the town level, analyze the history of only the 400
biggest cities in terms of 1871 population in the area that was under the Holy Roman Empire at the beginning of the second
Millennium (basically, the Center-North of Italy). For this reason, in the analysis with this set of instruments we are forced to
drop observations from the South Italy and from the Islands (Sicily and Sardinia).
25A detailed description of the data and the corresponding sources is provided in Appendix 8.1
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In addition, Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) show that the dispersion of the plant size distribution should
increase with market size. We use two variables for the dimension of the local market. The rst is given by
the provincial population, weighted by the relevance of nal demand for that particular industry, as derived
from the Italian Input-Output Use tables.26 The second measure is provincial gross domestic product.
The degree of urbanization could be correlated with the plant size distribution: even after controlling
for the intensity of nal demand, plant size could still be the outcome of the overall degree of urbaniza-
tion.27 Correlation between the plant size distribution and urbanization could also go through the dierent
geographic characteristics of the provinces, even within the same region. This translates into nature-given
starting or stumbling blocks for economic activity, and might confound our results. Urbanization in 1861 is
supposed to capture such time-constant provincial characteristics.28
Another possible determinant of the size distribution is the local stock of human capital. We see human
capital as an outcome of education. For this reason our regressions control for the share of university
graduates in the population of a given province.
Next, we take the eciency of the legal system into account, understood as the quality of contract
enforcement. Working on Mexican regions, Laeven and Woodru (2007) show that rm size is increasing
with the quality of the legal system. We proxy the quality of the legal system computing the average number
of days it took to complete rst-degree trials in labor-related aairs which ended in 2001, in each of the 165
Italian labor courts.
Apart from the direct link through contract enforcement, formal institutions inuence the size of eco-
nomic organizations through the development of nancial markets (Beck and Levine, 2003; La Porta et al.,
1997): well-functioning nancial markets allow rms to grow and to increase in terms of size.29 As in
Benfratello et al. (2008) we use the number of bank branches per province, normalized by population, as a
proxy for the degree of nancial development.
Finally, we investigate whether the impact of civic capital on the plant size distribution is heterogeneous
across industries. To this end, we characterize the production process of each industry according to the
intensity in human interactions. To quantify this dimension we have picked up the capital-labor ratio at the
four-digit industry level. We believe that this is a good proxy to measure the sensitivity of a given industry
to human relations, or, symmetrically, the extent to which it depends on standardized routines and process
automation.
In Table 2 we provide the full set of descriptive statistics for our data.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
26See Appendix 8.1 for further details.
27A classical reference linking plant growth and urbanization is Jacobs (1969).
28It will be explained below that picking historical urbanization is also particularly convenient for the rst stage of our
instrumental variables approach, where we regress civic capital on historical instruments and other regressors.
29However Rajan and Zingales (1998) point out that developed nancial markets not only allow rms to grow faster, but
also increase the birth rate of new rms, which are generally quite small. Hence, the overall eect of nancial development on
rm size is a priori ambiguous.
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4 The eect of civic capital: OLS results
4.1 Average plant size
We begin the regression analysis with the ordinary least squares estimation of the relationship between
average plant size and civic capital. The equation that we estimate is the following:
lnAPSi;j = 0 + 1 lnCCj + lnX
0
j2 + r + i + i;j (5)
where lnAPSi;j is the logarithm of employment-weighted average plant size in province j and industry i,
lnCCj is the log of the measure of civic capital in province j, lnXj is the log of a vector of provincial
controls, r denotes the region's dummy, i is a 4-digit unobserved industry eect, and i;j is the error
term.30 We apply to equation (5) a xed eect analysis, in the sense that we interpret our data set as a
panel, where observations pertaining to a given industry i are collected repeatedly over dierent provinces.
During the statistical inference process, we take into account the potential correlation among the regression
error terms using standard errors that are clustered both at the provincial level and at the industry level.31
Results conrm our hypothesis that the level of civic capital is positively correlated with average plant
size. In columns from (1) to (4) of Table 3 we regress average plant size on four dierent civic capital
variables: blood donations, volunteers, electoral turnout in referenda, and the rst principal component of
all these three measures. Except for the case of the referenda turnout, the results are always statistically
signicant. The coecient is most precisely estimated when the principal component is used. This is what
we expected, given that the motivation to extract the rst principal component is getting an accurate
measure of civic capital out of the three proxy variables. In addition to the region dummy variables, the
only control that is added at the provincial level in these estimates is the strength of nal demand. Also
nal demand turns out to aect positively average plant size. The latter result is in accordance with
theoretical models such as Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and empirical analyses such as Syverson (2004),
Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) and Laeven and Woodru (2007).
In columns from (5) to (8) of Table 3 we include additional determinants of plant size at the provincial
level. In order to claim that civic capital increases plant size by increasing trust and cooperation at the plant
level, we have to exclude that results are driven by certain characteristics of the environment in which a
plant operates that are correlated with both civic capital and the plant size distribution. These confounding
factors are dealt with by including appropriate provincial controls, described in section 3.3.
Turning to the results, they show little sensitivity to the inclusion of controls. This is partially reassuring,
though of course it does not completely solve the issue of unobserved heterogeneity. With the exception of
30When we measure civic capital by the principal component our equation is the following:
lnAPSi;j = 0 + 1PCj + lnX
0
j2 + r + i + i;j :
Here PCj is the principal component of the log of the three proxy variables, rather than the log of some variable.
31The two-way clustering procedure that we adopt tackles two issues. On the one side, the correlation between error terms
within provinces could be the result of disturbances at the local level, which could descend, for instance, from unobservable
provincial characteristics. On the other side, the correlation in the error terms within industries could still survive the inclusion
of the xed eects i. Think, for example, to some random event that led some big plants in an industry to locate in some
province. This could induce correlation in the error terms for observations in that particular industry. On inference with
clustered data see Cameron and Miller (2010).
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referenda turnover, both the number of blood donations and that of volunteers are still statistically signicant
at the 5% level. The same is true for the rst principal component, which is statistically signicant at the
1% level. It should be kept in mind that the coecient 1 is actually an elasticity, because both the
dependent variable and the regressors are logarithms. Then, in the case of blood donations, an estimated
elasticity equal to 0.07 means that a 10% increase in the number of blood donations at the provincial level is
associated to a 0.7% increase in weighted average size of plants at the level of 4-digit industries. The value
is very similar in the case of volunteers. It is only in the case of the referenda turnover that the coecient
is no longer signicant. This fact can be taken as evidence that, once the regional eects are washed out
by the dummy variables, r, there is not enough variability left in provincial turnout to allow a coecient
estimate which is statistically dierent from zero.32 The following example gives an idea of the economic
magnitude of the eect of civic capital when the measure is the rst principal component. Milan is a high
civic capital province (it ranks 21st in Italy), while Naples is the province with the lowest civic capital in
Italy. The estimated coecient equal to 0.05 implies that average plant size would be 25% larger if Naples
had the stock of civic capital of Milan.33 This is a sizeable impact given that the observed dierence is such
that plants are, on average, 47% larger in Milan.
Among the provincial controls, a coecient being dierent from zero in a statistically signicant way is
the number of bank branches. The fact that we get a negative sign can be explained by a certain prevalence
of younger and, for this reason, smaller plants were nancial development is higher.34 In our estimates the
role of civic capital seems to outweigh that of formal institutions, since the quality of contract enforcement,
expressed by the length of trials, is no longer statistically dierent from zero.
4.2 Standard deviation of plant size
Our empirical analysis proceeds with the estimation of the link between the standard deviation of plant size
and civic capital. The equation that we estimate is now the following:
lnSDPSi;j = 0 + 1 lnCCj + lnX
0
j2 + r + i + i;j (6)
where lnSDPSi;j is the logarithm of the standard deviation of plant size in industry i and province j,
computed according to equation (3). As before, we perform a xed eect analysis where the panel dimension
is in terms of 4-digit industries.
The results provided in Table 4, in the columns from (1) to (4), are obtained with just one provincial
control (nal demand). In columns from (5) to (8) we add the full set of controls. The following results
32When the proxy of civic capital is the rst principal component of the above mentioned three variables, it is less straight-
forward to provide an interpretation in terms of elasticity of the coecient of civic capital. As we outline in Appendix 8.2, the
extraction of the principal component is a statistical procedure whose output, starting from the log of our three proxies, is a
variable which has no observable counterpart. However, we think that this procedure is particular appropriate in a framework
as ours where we want to identify in the most accurate way the common behavioral attitude of the local population toward
trusting others, and in view of this a certain articiality of the measure can be tolerated.
33The principal component for Naples is -3.347, while for Milan it is +1.236. The contribution from the dierence in civic
capital to the dierence of average plant size in log terms for the two locations (lnAPSi;Milan  lnAPSi;Naples) is then equal
to 0.229, which corresponds to a dierence of 25% in terms of average size measured in levels.
34However, this control variable could be endogenous in equation (5). Guiso et al. (2004) stress the importance of civic
capital for the development of nancial markets in the Italian context.
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stand out. As before, all proxies of civic capital are statistically signicant, with the exception of electoral
turnout in referenda. Moreover, there is little sensitivity of the estimates with respect to the inclusion of
the full set of provincial controls. The elasticity of the standard deviation with respect to civic capital is
0.08 for blood donations and for volunteers.
The results suggest that the impact of civic capital, although smaller in magnitude, is qualitatively
similar to that of market demand: it increases both the rst and the second moment of the distribution of
plant size. As to the other controls, nancial development, measured by the number of bank branches, is
associated to a less dispersed distribution in terms of size (probably due to a larger number of small plants
in the province-industry, something which makes the distribution more even).
4.3 A graphical discussion of the results
In order to discuss our results, we go back to Figure 1, where the distribution for NACE 2862 in Siena and
Pistoia is plotted. We want to provide a stylized graphical interpretation of how civic capital shifts the
distribution of plant size. The two provinces are roughly equal in terms of overall size (measured by total
GDP) and belong to the same region (Tuscany). However, they dier markedly in the endowment of civic
capital. While Pistoia's endowment ranks 42nd in Italy in terms of the rst principal component, Siena has
the 3rd highest endowment. The gure highlights that civic capital increases the number of plants at the
top end of the distribution: comparing the height of the dark gray bar in size bin number 6 reveals that
relatively large plants are more frequent in Siena than in Pistoia. Moreover, Siena hosts establishments
which have no size counterpart in Pistoia (there is no plant in size bin number 7 in Pistoia). We do not
nd such a pattern in the left tail: in size bins number 2, 3, and 4 (where the total number of employees is
small, ranging from 1 to 5), the distribution is actually fatter in Pistoia than in Siena.35
The mechanism we have in mind to explain why civic capital increases both average plant size and the
standard deviation of plant size is coherent with this stylized example. Our argument hinges upon a larger
mass of big plants being active in the local areas with high civic capital. This happens because of the
dierent channels outlined in the conceptual framework, and gives rise to a magnication of the local plant
size distribution which ultimately increases also the standard deviation of size. In the following section we
provide further evidence on this.
5 Extensions and robustness of the analysis
5.1 Heterogeneity across industries, and small vs. large plants
In Table 5, we show that the role of civic capital for the rst and second moment of the plant size distribution
is not homogeneous across industries. In section 2 we have stressed the importance of civic capital for team
production and cooperative behavior in one-shot interactions. Consequently, we expect civic capital to be
more important in industries where the production process is more intensive in human interactions. To test
this, we have added an interaction term to our baseline specication where the rst principal component of
35Qualitatively, we get the same results looking at the light gray bars, where the weights are given by the number of plants
that each size bin contains.
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civic capital is interacted with the capital-labor ratio measured at the 4-digit industry level.36 Accordingly,
the equation for APS becomes
lnAPSi;j = 0 + 1PCj + 2PCj  lnKLi + lnX 0j3 + r + i + i;j (7)
where PCj is the value of the principal component in province j, and KLi is the capital-labor ratio of
industry i. The corresponding results are shown in columns (1) and (4) of Table 5. The negative estimate
for the coecient 2 of the interaction between the capital-labor ratio and the measurement of civic capital
is in line with our reasoning: the magnitude of the impact of civic capital on the plant size distribution
decreases as the industry's capital-labor ratio goes up. The explanation is that problems of coordination
and shirking behavior, which civic capital alleviates, are more important for output production in sectors
with a low degree of automation and a high intensity of human interactions.
In order to get a more precise picture of the heterogeneous eect of civic capital across industries we
evaluate the marginal eects for dierent values of the capital-labor ratio. The industry with the median
value of capital-labor intensity is Manufacture of ceramic tiles and ags (lnKLi = 4:034). The estimate
of the marginal eect of civic capital on APS in this specic industry is positive and equal to 0:052.37
Performing an F-test on the linear restriction (1 + 2  4:034) = 0 reveals that this eect is statistically
dierent from zero at the 1% level. Repeating this exercise, we nd that the marginal eect of civic capital
is no longer dierent from zero at the 5% level only in the case of the top 15% industries in terms of the
capital-labor ratio. Hence, this exercise shows that civic capital seems to have no impact for the size of
plants only in industries which are very intensive in the use of capital.
Another simple partition of 4-digit industries can be obtained by grouping them in two dierent sets of
industries, namely manufacturing (Nace section D) and services (Nace sections from E onward). We then
ask whether manufacturing is any dierent from services. Results are again displayed in Table 5, in columns
(2), (3), (5) and (6). For both manufacturing and services, civic capital increases average plant size and the
standard deviation. The eect seems to be slightly more pronounced for manufacturing. It is interesting
to observe that the coecients of the control variables such as historical urbanization, university graduates
and bank branches display substantial dierences in both sign and signicance among the two sectors.38
However, we can conclude that the positive eect of civic capital on both APS and SDPS is not driven by
a particular sector, be it manufacturing or services.
We then perform another exercise, testing, in two separate regressions, the impact of civic capital on the
log of total employment in a province-industry, and on the log of the total number of establishments. The
corresponding results, displayed in columns (7) and (8) of Table 5, provide evidence that there is a positive
eect on total employment, while the eect on the number of establishments is not statistically dierent
from zero. Taking the last regression as a starting point, we then ask whether there is some dierence
36See Appendix 8.1 for a description of the way the capital-labor ratio is obtained.
37To obtain the estimate of the impact of civic capital in a specic industry one simply needs the value for lnKLi, and the
estimates for 1 and 2. The value is then equal (1 + 2  lnKLi).
38Urbanization in 1861 and university graduates have a statistically signicant positive coecient in the regression for
services. This makes sense from an economic point of view, as long as larger plants in the service sector are located in more
urbanized areas, and service provision is comparatively more intensive in skilled workers, so that larger service providers can
be expected to locate where many college graduates live. The number of bank branches is negatively related to APS and SDPS
only in manufacturing.
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between small and large plants. Our conceptual framework suggests that the cooperation-enhancing eect
of civic capital (working through a facilitation in the delegation of authority, a reduction in shirking, and
a higher propensity to cooperate in one-shot transactions) should be more important for the functioning of
large plants. On the contrary, in small establishments, cooperation can be sustained by other mechanisms
such as direct monitoring or kinship bonds. Moreover, in small plants interactions between workers become
more frequent, so that relational contracts are an ecient enforcement device. Therefore, we expect that
especially the number of large plants should be raised by civic capital. In order to address this question, we
count for each province-industry the number of plants with less than twenty employees (small plants), and
those with at least twenty employees (large plants).39 The results are presented in columns (9) and (10) of
Table 5, and point to a positive eect of civic capital which is statistically dierent from zero in the case of
large plants only. The point estimate is larger when the dependent variable is the number of big plants.40
This is in line with our conceptual framework.
5.2 Further robustness and sensitivity checks
Other robustness checks that we have performed are provided in Table 6. The rst ve columns present
the result for APS, while the last ve present the result for SDPS. In columns (1) and (6) the dependent
variable is the average plant size of equation (2), and the standard deviation of equation (4), respectively.
Although somewhat reduced in magnitude, the eect of civic capital is still positive and signicant. We can
conclude that our results are not driven by the choice of the weighting scheme in the construction of the
dependent variables.
In columns (2) and (7) we check whether results are aected by the number of variables we employ in
the computation of the rst principal component. Specically, one may wonder whether excluding referenda
turnout (whose coecient is not statistically signicant when we employ it as a measure of civic capital)
from the computation of the rst principal component aects the results. We prove that this is not the case.
Again, the estimated coecients are just slightly smaller in magnitude than in the baseline regressions.
In columns (3) and (8) we add yet another provincial control, namely GDP in 2001. The inclusion of
GDP reduces the statistical signicance of the other controls such as nal demand. However, the estimates
related to the impact of civic capital are aected in a negligible manner.
In columns (4) and (9) we consider the full set of available observations. We mentioned previously that
we exclude from the baseline regressions those observations where the dependent variable is based just on
one or two plants. In these columns we check whether adding these observations to the sample changes the
results in some manner. The actual change is tiny.
Finally, in columns (5) and (10) we run regressions after excluding the provinces of Rome, Milan and
Turin. As we show in Figures 2 and 3, these are the provinces with the highest average size and the highest
39The choice of this threshold is arbitrary. We have tried with other size thresholds such as 50 employees and the results do
not change.
40Since the number of plants above or below a certain size threshold in a province-industry is a count variable, this analysis
is suitable for a Poisson regression. In this case, the routine in Stata allows only for one-way clustering in the standard errors
(in terms of 4-digit industries). This notwithstanding, the results are qualitatively close to the one presented in the table,
and point to an impact of civic capital which is larger in magnitude in the case of large plants, with the coecient still being
statistically dierent from zero at the 1% level.
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standard deviation of size. Therefore, it could be that our results are driven by them. Our estimates prove
that their exclusion from the sample bears no particular change to our results.
6 The eect of civic capital: evidence from 2SLS estimation
6.1 Motivation and identifying assumptions
Apart from problems of measurement error in our main explanatory variable that we have addressed com-
puting the rst principal component of three dierent proxies of civic capital, there are other reasons which
might prevent us from interpreting results in Tables 3 and 4 as causal. Consider the case of reverse causa-
tion. If a large plant locates in a province average plant size increases, and, arguably, the local population
is economically better o. As a consequence of this improvement in material well-being, individuals develop
civic virtues, i.e. they donate blood, vote in referenda and engage as volunteers. Moreover, although we
control for a range of confounding factors, we cannot completely exclude that other omitted variables bias
our estimates.
In order to prove that our results are neither driven by omitted variables nor by reversed causality,
we provide evidence from two-stage least square estimates. The rst set of instruments are lagged proxy
variables of civic capital, namely members of mutual aid societies in 1873, and electoral turnout around the
1920s, similarly to Buonanno et al. (2009) and de Blasio and Nuzzo (2010). The second set of instruments
goes even further back in time. It relies on Putnam (1993), who argues that the huge dierences in the
endowment of civic capital across Italian regions can be traced back to dierent political regimes prevailing
at the beginning of the second millennium. In particular, he stresses the role of free-city states that emerged
in the Center-North of the Italian peninsula. Testing Putnam (1993)'s theory, Guiso et al. (2008a) shows
that the free-city state experience has a causal eect on the accumulation of civic capital.
We have good reasons to believe that these historical measures are highly correlated with the current
stock of civic capital. The literature has stressed the persistence of civic capital over long periods of time,
highlighting the crucial role of intergenerational transmission of values and beliefs from parents to their
ospring (Tabellini, 2008; Guiso et al., 2008b). Hence, the stock of today's civic capital in a certain local
area can be explained to a large extent by historical values of civic capital in that area. The high persistence
of civic capital over time translates, as we show below, into a strong rst stage relationship.
The other requirement for the validity of our instruments is that they must be uncorrelated with the error
term i;j in equations (5) and (6) for APS and SDPS. This amounts to saying that, conditional on the other
regressors, the historical instrumental variables have had no direct eect on the rst and second moment
of the plant size distribution. This could be a somewhat strong assumption, as our historical instruments
might have aected current economic development and hence current plant size through channels other than
the current stock of civic capital. In order to address this threat, we include the log of provincial GDP as an
additional regressor in all 2SLS specications. The rationale is that this variable captures all the possible
eects of the historical instrumental variables on the plant size distribution that work through economic
development. This makes us more condent that the exclusion restriction is not violated.
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6.2 Results
6.2.1 Civic capital in the 19th and early 20th century
The rst set of instruments dates back to the middle of the 19th and early 20th century. The 19th century
experienced a unusual movement in popular sociability, not only in Italy but in whole Western Europe. As
a response to the new economic and social calamities brought about by the process of industrialization,
traditional associations like guilds and religious societies were replaced by more civic, charitable and educa-
tional organizations. One prominent manifestation of this new collectivism was the creation of mutual aid
societies. Their members enjoyed benets such as medical care, insurance against work accidents and basic
instruction. Importantly, the functioning of mutual aid societies relied solely on the principle of reciprocity:
absent any kind of formal enforcement and coordination, their members joined individual forces for mutual
benet. Putnam (1993) describes them as \a locally organized, underfunded, self-help version of what the
twentieth century would call the welfare state". Therefore, the membership rate in mutual aid societies in
an area is a good proxy for the stock of local civic capital. The year to which this information refers to is
1873.
The second measure of civic capital is electoral turnout in the 1920s. Specically, we average turnout
over four political elections: national elections from 1919 and 1921 and provincial and communal elections
from 1920. The choice of these elections is dictated by the fact that they were the only elections with
universal surage before the advent of fascism.
Using lagged proxy variables of civic capital we again have to exclude reverse causation. In other words,
the pattern of civic capital in the past should not be the outcome of economic well-being at that time. We
address this issue by analyzing the relationship between urbanization rate in 1861, which relates to economic
development at that time, and the two instruments.41 The correlation coecient between past urbanization
and members of mutual aid societies is -0.05. This implies that for the year 1873 we have, if anything, a
negative relationship between civic capital and material well-being. Consequently, we are condent that this
measure of civic capital is exogenous from the point of view of our analysis. As for turnout in the 1920s,
the correlation coecient is -0.24.42 We also run a robustness check in which we instrument civic capital
only by the membership rate in mutual aid societies in 1873.
Our potentially endogenous variable (the current level of civic capital, as given by the principal compo-
nent) is expressed in the following way in the rst stage regression:
PCj = !0 + !1 lnCC
Aid
r + !2 lnCC
Turn
r + lnX
0
j!3 + mr + j ; (8)
where lnCCAidr is the stock of civic capital in region r proxied by the log of the membership in mutual
aid societies in 1873 (normalized by population), while lnCCTurnr is the log of average regional turnout of
elections in the 1920s. These two terms are meant to capture the persistent component of civic capital. Since
41It is Tabellini (2010) who argues that past urbanization is a good proxy for past economic development. In any case, we
signal that some caution has to be paid when dealing with historical urbanization in the context of Southern Italy. As explained
by Malanima (2005), in 1861 many big cities in Southern Italy were actually agrotowns, since a large share of inhabitants was
employed in agriculture, and not in manufacturing or services.
42However, this negative relationship is less reliable for our purposes, as we are comparing urbanization rate in 1861 with
the measure of civic capital 60 years later.
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these measures are only available at the regional level we cannot include regional dummy variables. Instead,
we replace them with macro-region dummies, mr.
43 The vector lnX 0j contains all provincial covariates,
including provincial GDP.
The bottom part of Table 7 (Panel B) contains the results from the rst stage. Column (2) refers to
APS, while (6) refers to SDPS. The coecient estimates of both instruments have the expected positive
sign and are statistically dierent from zero. Moreover, the instruments explain a very large share of the
variation in current civic capital, as evidenced by the high rst-stage R2. Given the high persistence of civic
capital across time, this comes as no surprise. As for the other covariates, it is important to stress the role of
urbanization in 1861 in equation (8). As mentioned by Putnam (1993), mutual aid societies predominantly
served craftsmen and artisans in cities as a form of insurance against economic and social calamities. As
such, they were mostly an urban phenomenon. Hence, including historical urbanization in 1861 among the
regressors improves the reliability of the instruments as it controls for the degree of urbanization at that
period, something which might confound the results.44
Results from the second stage are depicted in Panel A of Table 7. In order to provide comparable OLS
results, we have re-estimated equation (5) with macro-region instead of region dummies. The corresponding
results are shown in columns (1) and (5). As for the 2SLS estimates, they are qualitatively similar to the
OLS results. The coecient of civic capital is positive and statistically dierent from zero at the 1% level.
For both APS and SDPS the 2SLS estimates for civic capital are larger than their OLS counterparts. Given
our concerns of reversed causality and omitted variables, this is not necessarily what we expected. Actually,
if results in Tables 3 and 4 were driven by reversed causality, then the 2SLS coecients should have been
lower than the OLS coecients from columns (1) and (5). Two possible reasons might explain the increase
of 2SLS estimates with respect to the OLS ones. First, despite the computation of the principal component,
civic capital could still be measured with error. The 2SLS helps removing the attenuation bias. Second,
the increase in the estimates may be a sign of violation of the exclusion restriction. Given that we have
more than one instrument we can perform a test of overidentication to assess this issue. The p-value of the
test statistic is reported at the bottom of Panel A. It is suciently high in order to reject the alternative
hypothesis, according to which at least one of the two instruments is not exogenous. Hence, the data support
the assumption that the exclusion restriction is not violated.45
In columns (3) and (7) we consider an alternative specication where the membership rate in mutual
aid societies is the only instrument for our two-stages approach. The rst stage relationship remains strong.
As for the second stage result, there is hardly any change with respect to columns (2) and (6).
6.2.2 Free-city state experiences during the Middle Age
The second strategy to instrument the current level of civic capital relies on the number of free-city states
experiences that were present in the territory of each province in 1300. Putnam (1993) argues that the huge
43The macro-regions are ve: North-West, North-East, Center, South, Islands.
44Actually, we get a negative relationship between historical urbanization and the current level of civic capital in the rst
stage. This mirrors the negative correlations that we have shown above between historical urbanization and past civic capital.
45The test statistics have to be interpreted with caution, though. While testing the exogeneity of, say, the number of mutual
aid societies in 1873, the overidentication test explicitly assumes that the other instrument, turnout in the 1920s, is truly
exogenous. Therefore, the test cannot detect whether both instruments are invalid.
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dierences in the endowment of civic capital across Italian regions are due to the emergence of free-city
states in the Center-North of the country in the Middle Age. Lacking any centralized form of government,
their citizens had to collaborate to provide solutions to problems of common interest, rst and foremost to
defend their cities against foreign invaders. As a consequence, individuals developed a sense of cooperation
and concern for common issues resulting in a high stock of civic capital.
We exploit information on free-city states in 1300 provided by Guiso et al. (2008a). More specically,
for each province, we count the number of cities that were a communal republic in the year 1300, which
gives a minimum of zero and a maximum of three free-city states per province.46 Figure 9 shows the number
of free-city states per province across Italy. The information is only available for the Center-North, so we
exclude the South and the Islands from this exercise.
In the rst stage regression we plug three dierent dummy variables capturing the number of free-city
states (be it 1, 2 or 3). We exclude from the regression the dummy variable for the case when there are no
free-city states, which becomes our reference group. The specication in the rst stage is the following:
PCj = !0 + !1City
1
j + !2City
2
j + !3City
3
j + lnX
0
j!4 + mr + j (9)
where City1j , City
2
j , and City
3
j are the dummy variables for 1, 2, or 3 free-city states in the province,
respectively. The macro-region dummies and provincial covariates are also included. Columns (4) and (8)
in Panel B show that also these instruments are good predictors for the current level of civic capital. As
expected, ceteris paribus, provinces with one free-city state in 1300 display a higher level of civic capital
than provinces with no free-city states. The impact of having two free-city states in 1300 is even larger.
Performing an F-test reveals that the instruments are jointly signicant (see the bottom part of Panel B).
Compared to the columns (2) and (6) the rst-stage R2 is somewhat reduced.
The second stage results in Panel A show a positive and statistically signicant eect of civic capital on
both average plant size and the standard deviation of size. Quantitatively, the estimates of civic capital are
very close to the OLS results.47 The p-values of the overidentication tests do not reveal any violation of
the exclusion restriction, neither for average size nor for the standard deviation of size.
7 Conclusion
Employing census data on establishments in Italy, we have shown how trust, captured by the geography of
civic capital, shapes the size distribution of plants. More specically, our results reveal that trust increases
the average and the dispersion of the size distribution in 4-digit industries across provinces. The eect of
civic capital holds for both manufacturing and services, and is more important for industries relying more
heavily on labor as an input. Our econometric specications address several potential threats. First, a set of
46Obviously, one needs to control for the size of the province since the number of free-city states could be a function of the
dimension of the province. This is achieved through the inclusion in the rst stage of variables such as GDP, nal demand,
urbanization in 1861. Notice that there are just three provinces with 3 free-city states (Alessandria, Cuneo and Turin) and
they are all located in Piedmont.
47When we drop the South and the Islands from the sample and re-run the regression specications of columns (1) and (5)
of Table 7, we get a point estimate of 0.081 for APS and 0.105 for SDPS. Both estimates are statistically dierent from zero
at the 1% level. The comprehensive results are available upon request.
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appropriate controls excludes that our results are driven by other determinants of plant size such as market
demand, nancial development, human capital, judicial ineciency and past urbanization. Moreover, xed
eects at a highly disaggregated industry and spatial level are included. Third, we explicitly address the
sources of endogeneity of trust. On the one hand, extracting the rst principal component of three well-
established measures of trust minimizes the problem of measurement error. On the other hand, the variation
of civic capital in the middle of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, and free-city state experiences
in 1300 serve as instruments for current trust. We get the conclusion that it is unlikely that our results are
driven by reversed causality or omitted variables bias.
Recently, Algan and Cahuc (2010) and Tabellini (2010) have established a causal eect of trust on
aggregate economic outcomes, such as per-capita GDP and growth rates. While these studies provide
important new insights, they do not suggest specic channels of how trust enhances the growth potential of
economies. Our study hints that one mechanism of how trust translates into growth might be that it allows
plants to grow large. Indeed, Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that two thirds of industry growth can be
attributed to the growth in existing establishments rather than to the formation of new ones.
We think that more evidence is needed on the relation between trust and the growth of organizations.
Based on a cross-section, our analysis does not allow to derive dynamic patterns. Moreover, observing
shifts over time could uncover the impact of trust with respect to rm entry and exit. Another interesting
extension consists in identifying how trust precisely aects rm organization. We have presented several,
mutually not exclusive, channels without being able to identify the relative impact of each of them. In
order to open this black box, survey data which shed light on the decision making process and internal
organization of rms, such as those used in Bloom et al. (2009), are very promising.
8 Appendix
8.1 Detailed description of the data
8.1.1 Dependent variables
The construction of the dependent variables is described in detail in the main text. The information is
taken from the 8th Istat Census of Industry and Services, corresponding to the year 2001.
8.1.2 Measures or instruments for civic capital
Blood donations: The number of blood donations per 1000 inhabitants, disaggregated by province. The
data are collected from the health authorities of Italian regions. In each region, regional health authorities
collect data on blood donations and subsequently send this information to the Superior Institute of Health
(Istituto Superiore di Sanita) which, in turn, maintains a National and Regional Registry of Blood and
Plasma. Provincial data on blood donations are not available for Apulia and Lazio. For the provinces of
these two regions we take the total regional value. Data refer to the year 2002 and the source is Cartocci
(2007) on data from the Superior Institute of Health.
Volunteers: It is the number of volunteers in non-prot organizations. Data refer to the year 2000 and
the source is de Blasio and Nuzzo (2010).
Referenda turnout : It is the average provincial electoral turnout for the referenda on the choice between
republic and monarchy (1946), divorce (1974), public nancing of political parties (1978), public security
and anti-terrorism measures (1981), abortion (1981), wage escalator regulations (1985) and nuclear power
and hunting regulations (1987). The following eight provinces were created after 1995: Biella, Lecco,
Lodi, Rimini, Prato, Crotone, Vibo Valentia, Verbano-Cusio-Ossola. The provinces to which they belonged
before 1995 and whose value has been assigned to them appear in parenthesis: Biella (Vercelli), Lecco (simple
average of Bergamo and Como), Lodi (Milan), Rimini (Forl-Cesena), Prato (Firenze), Crotone (Catanzaro),
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Vibo Valentia (Catanzaro), Verbano-Cusio-Ossola (Novara). The source of data for referendum turnout is
the Ministry of the Interior.
Mutual aid societies in 1873 : It is the number of the members in mutual aid societies in 1873 at the
regional level, standardized by 100,000 inhabitants. Data for Valle d'Aosta, Trentino-Alto Adige and Friuli-
Venezia Giulia are missing. We adopt the values of Piedmont for Valle d'Aosta, the region from where it
was split o. For the latter two regions, we adopt the values of Veneto, which is socio-geographically the
closest one. Additionally, there is no data for Molise, for which we take the value of Abruzzo, the region
from where it was split o. The source is Putnam (1993).
Turnout in 1920s: It is the average electoral turnout at the regional level in the national elections of
1919 and 1921, provincial elections in 1920 and communal elections in 1920. There is no data for the regions
of Valle d'Aosta, Trentino-Alto Adige and Friuli-Venezia Giulia. We adopt the values of Piedmont for Valle
d'Aosta, the region from which it was split o. For the latter two regions, we adopt the values of Veneto,
which is socio-geographically the closest one. The source of these data is Putnam (1993).
Number of free-city states in 1300 : It is the number of free-city state experiences in the territory of each
province in 1300. Data are from Guiso et al. (2008a). In order to reduce the cost of collecting historical data
at the town level, the authors analyze the history of only the 400 biggest cities in terms of 1871 population
in the area that was under the Holy Roman Empire at the beginning of the second Millennium (basically,
the Center-North of Italy).
8.1.3 Other explanatory variables
Final demand : The variable is constructed as follows. First of all, we assign each 4-digit industry to the
corresponding 2-digit sector. For each 2-digit industry, we compute from Input-Output Use tables for Italy
the share of output being purchased by the nal demand coming from households, public institutions and
non-prot organizations. This share is then multiplied by total provincial population to get an exact measure
of the dimension of the local market in terms of nal demand for all the industries belonging to a given
2-digit sector (the variable then varies by 2-digit sector and by province). Both Input-Output Use tables
and provincial population are from Istat and are taken with reference to the year 2001.
Urbanization in 1861 : This variable is the share of total provincial population living in cities with more
than 10,000 inhabitants in 1861. Data on city size come from the \Italian Urban Population Database
1300-1861", provided by Paolo Malanima (http://www.paolomalanima.it/default le/Page646.htm). The
number of total provincial population in 1861 is taken from Populstat (http://www.populstat.info/).
University graduates: It is the number of university graduates per province, divided by total provincial
population. The data refer to the year 2001 and are from Istat.
Bank branches: It is the number of bank branches per 1000 inhabitants, disaggregated by province. The
data refer to the year 2001 with the exception of the provinces of Vibo Valentia and Verbano-Cusio-Ossola.
For those two provinces, the values corresponding to the year 1998 are taken. The source of the data is the
Bank of Italy.
Length of labor trials: It is the number of days it takes to complete a rst degree trial in labor aairs
in each of the 165 Italian labor courts. The data refer to the year 2001 and are provided by Istat in the
data base Territorial Information System on Justice (Sistema Informativo Territoriale sulla Giustizia). Since
there are more courts than provinces and since in some cases the territory of a court belongs to two dierent
provinces we proceed as follows. First, we assign to each city of the province the value of the court to which
the city belongs. This information is then averaged for all the cities belonging to the same province to get
a provincial variable.
GDP : It is the provincial nominal gross domestic product in 2001, expressed in thousands of euros. The
source is Istat.
Capital-labor ratio: It is calculated at the 4-digit industry level from the balance sheet data of 86,000
rms operating in Italy in 2001. For each rm, we compute the capital-labor ratio as the sum of tangible
and intangible assets (measured in thousands of euros) over the total number of employees. We then take
the average value for all the rms belonging to the same industry. The data source is Bureau van Dijk's
AIDA data set.
8.2 Derivation of the rst principal component
The intuition of principal component analysis (PCA) in our context is the following: given the three proxies
of civic capital, each province corresponds to a point in a three dimensional vector space. The idea of PCA
is to nd a linear combination of the three variables which re-expresses the original data set in such a way
that it captures most of the common variance. This linear combination corresponds to the rst principal
component.
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In general terms, the rst principal component can be derived as follows (see Jollie, 2002): vector x
denominates the data consisting of p random variables (the three proxies of civic capital in our case) and
vector 1 consists of p constants, 11; 12; : : : 1p. Consider the linear function 
0
1x:
01x = 11x1 + 12x2 + : : :+ 1pxp =
pX
j=1
1jxj (10)
Finding the rst principal component amounts to determine the elements of 1 which maximize the
variance of V ar[01x] = 
0
1S1, where S is the covariance matrix of x. The vector 1 is constrained to have
unit length, which implies that 011 = 1. The corresponding Lagrange maximization function takes the
following form:
01S1   (011   1): (11)
Maximizing (11) with respect to 1 gives
(S  Ip)1 = 0; (12)
in which the Lagrange multiplier  is the eigenvalue of S and the corresponding eigenvector is 1. Ip is
the p-dimensional identity matrix. Because the quantity to be maximized is 01S1 = 
0
11 = , the
eigenvector with the highest eigenvalue is chosen. The rst principal component is then 01x. In our data,
the highest eigenvalue takes the value of 2.48. The associated eigenvector explains 75% of the total variance.
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Figure 1: Empirical distribution of plant size in NACE industry 2862 (Manufacture of tools) in two provinces
of Tuscany (Siena and Pistoia). On the top of each couple of bars there is the average size of that bin, given
by the total amount of employment divided by the total amount of establishments.
Figure 2: Average plant size, weighted by the number of employees in each size bin. Values are provincial
averages over 4-digit industries.
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Figure 3: Standard deviation of size, weighted by the number of employees in each size bin. Values are
provincial averages over 4-digit industries.
Figure 4: Blood donations per 1000 inhabitants.
28
Figure 5: Number of volunteers in non-prot organizations per 100,000 inhabitants.
Figure 6: Electoral turnout in referenda, averaged over 7 referenda that took place between 1946 and 1987.
29
Figure 7: Map of civic capital measured by the rst principal component of blood donations, volunteering,
and electoral turnout.
Figure 8: Map of civic capital measured by the variation of the rst principal component within regions.
The gure plots the residuals of a regression of the provincial principal component on regional dummies.
30
Figure 9: Number of free-city states by province in 1300 (Source: Guiso et al., 2008a). South of Italy and
Islands are not included.
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Table 1: Correlation among the proxy variables of civic capital
Referenda turnout (log) Volunteers (log) Blood donations (log)
Volunteers (log) 0.69 1
Blood donations (log) 0.61 0.57 1
Principal component 0.89 0.87 0.84
Note: The number of observations is 103. Blood donations is the log of the number of blood dona-
tions per 100,000 inhabitants inn 2002; Volunteers is the log of the number of volunteers in non-prot
institutions per 100,000 inhabitants in 2000; Referenda turnout is the log of the average electoral
turnout in referenda between 1946 and 1987; Principal component is the the rst principal compo-
nent of the above mentioned three proxies of civic capital. All correlations are statistically dierent
from zero at the 1% level.
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4
-d
ig
it
in
d
u
s-
tr
ie
s.
5
m
a
cr
o
-r
eg
io
n
a
l
d
u
m
m
ie
s
a
re
a
ls
o
in
cl
u
d
ed
.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
cl
u
st
er
ed
a
t
th
e
p
ro
v
in
ce
a
n
d
in
d
u
st
ry
le
v
el
.
P
a
n
el
A
sh
o
w
s
th
e
se
co
n
d
st
a
g
e,
w
h
il
e
P
a
n
el
B
sh
o
w
s
th
e

rs
t
st
a
g
e.
In
th
e

rs
t
st
a
g
e
w
e
u
se
tw
o
se
ts
o
f
in
st
ru
m
en
ta
l
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s.
T
h
e

rs
t
se
t
o
f
in
st
ru
m
en
ta
l
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s,
a
v
a
il
a
b
le
a
t
th
e
re
g
io
n
a
l
le
v
el
,
a
re
:
A
id
so
ci
et
ie
s
in
1
8
7
3
is
th
e
lo
g
o
f
th
e
m
em
b
er
s
o
f
m
u
tu
a
l
a
id
so
ci
et
ie
s
p
er
1
0
0
,0
0
0
in
h
a
b
it
a
n
ts
in
1
8
7
3
;
T
u
rn
o
u
t
in
1
9
2
0
s
is
th
e
th
e
lo
g
o
f
tu
rn
o
u
t
in
th
e
el
ec
ti
o
n
s
th
a
t
to
o
k
p
la
ce
in
It
a
ly
in
th
e
1
9
2
0
s.
T
h
e
se
co
n
d
se
t
o
f
in
st
ru
m
en
ta
l
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
a
re
d
u
m
m
ie
s
fo
r
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
fr
ee
-c
it
y
st
a
te
s
a
t
th
e
p
ro
v
in
ci
a
l
le
v
el
in
1
3
0
0
.
U
n
le
ss
o
th
er
w
is
e
st
a
te
d
,
th
e
d
a
ta
re
fe
r
to
th
e
y
ea
r
2
0
0
1
.
*
*
*
,*
*
,*
d
en
o
te
si
g
n
i
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
%
,
5
%
,
1
0
%
le
v
el
,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
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